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I.
There are commonsense grounds for claiming that a sculpture is perceived as a many-sided painting. The differences between the ways paintings and sculptures are perceived seem trivial. Some sculptures cause one to move around more than most paintings, and often one has the desire to touch sculptures. But even with such sculptures, sight seems to be the dominant sense.
The following statement by Rhys Carpenter is representative of the long, almost unchallenged tradition that finds no basic differences between our perceptions of paintings and sculptures: 'It may be argued-and with entire warrant-that sculpture frequently involves an appeal to our sense of touch and physical contact; but so does painting. Such tactile sensations are, in either art, induced and secondary, being derivative of subjective mental association. In a painting by Titian or Bronzino, the representation of material textures such as fur and velvet may be so visually exact that it evokes in us a memory of how velvet and fur may feel when we stroke them. I do not think that sculpture's tactual appeal is very different or much stronger. Any dissenting opinion is probably inspired by the heightened physical actuality of sculptural presentation: we cannot directly sense a painted texture by touching the canvas, whereas we can actually explore with our fingers the solid sculptural shape. But the logic is faulty if it is thence inferred that sculpture is more immediately involved in the tactile sense; for, at best, we can only touch the material medium and not the artistic representation which is intended and calculated for the eye's contemplative vision' [ Or consider what the sculptor Adolf von Hildenbrand has to say: 'If the figure offers more than one plane picture, there will, of course, be more than one position from which to view it. The number of satisfactory aspects a work may have depends on the artist's conception; it may be two, front and rear, as in statues of a relief-like character; it may be three, or four, etc.... But among all the possible aspects there will always be one that dominates. This one is representative of the total plastic nature of the object, and, like a picture or relief, expresses it all in a single two-dimensional impression. It stands for the virtual visual idea underlying the plastic representation which dominated the artist's mind when he created the work.... The problem in a plastic ensemble consists in arranging a solid figure so that it can afford us such a picture' [3] . For Hildenbrand there is a disturbing quality about the 3-dimensional that can be overcome only by a relief-view. The 3-dimensional must be translated into the 2-dimensional, for otherwise the object remains 'real' and the artistic 'idea' is lost. Thus low-relief is held to be the basic sculptural form, and high-relief and sculpture in the round are simply ways for presenting a series of lowrelief pictures.
There is a wide consensus among art critics, historians and aestheticians that paintings and sculptures are perceived mainly or solely by the eye, the visual sensory apparatus functioning in essentially the same way for both kinds of objects. Furthermore, the few who disagree, such as Herbert Read and Susanne Langer, fail to back up their arguments with accurate descriptions of how, in fact, these objects are differently perceived [4] . I maintain that the perception of paintings and of sculptures is significantly different. Moreover, the failure to be clear about this difference not only confuses an understanding of these two art forms but, in turn, tends to muddy the perception of them, The traditional ways of describing paintings and sculptures, as I have argued elsewhere [5] , have been confused by the intrusion of explanatory interpretations. These descriptions have been determined less by the phenomena-i.e. the two kinds of objects-than by theoretical points of view that attempt to explain the phenomena rather than to describe them as they are actually experienced. Like a camera with set lens, such theoretical approaches frame only that which fits their focus. Often these theoretically-based descriptions have brought out facets of the phenomena that otherwise would have been overlooked. But, at the same time, this narrowness of focus has caused much to be missed.
I maintain that this is especially true of some of the most important differences between paintings and sculptures. I want to get back to these objects themselves in their splendid singularity. The aesthetic experience is my access. In the aesthetic experience my undivided attention is sustained on the work. There is no subject/object dichotomy. I lose explicit self-consciousness, my sense of being separate, of standing apart from the work. Nevertheless, the aesthetic experience is active. Concepts are initiated and controlled by my perceptions. These perceptions and conceptions are experienced as fused, as a unity with the work. Thus I allow the work to be a phenomenon, to unfold unto its fullness, its thingliness or individuality, as the later Heidegger urged. Then I want to describe what I find. And, when I do this, I do not find an external object-set forth and distanced from me in the mode of analytic thought-but a thing-as-feltand-meant. But how can I describe this thing without objectifying it, without twisting it into the frame of some conceptual point of view? I can do *this by allowing my aesthetic experience of the thing suggest the concepts to be used in my descriptions. I will .allow the conceptuality that was already involved in my aesthetic experience to initiate and control the concepts used in my descriptions. I will 'think from' the aesthetic experiences of paintings and sculptures. Then my concepts will not be set presuppositions, but an emerging context that helps prevent the twisting of the perceptual evidence.
Phenomenological description unadulterated by conceptual biases is an ideal that can only be approached, of course, but it can be approached [6] . In any case, I will attempt in the following descriptions to follow Charles Sanders Peirce's stricture regarding his own approach to phenomenology: 'The student's great effort is not to be influenced by any tradition, any authority, any reason for supposing that such and such ought to be the facts, or any fancies of any kind, and to confine himself to honest singleminded observation of appearances.' In turn, as Peirce also says, 'the reader, upon his side, must repeat the author's observations for himself, and decide from his own observations whether the author's account of the appearances is correct or not' [7] . With the Arp, the space between was furrowed with forces, the shadows, for example, intruded into that space, stretching, shrinking, warping and twisting, while the reflected light from the bronze seemed to warm its surrounds. The smoke of the neighboring viewer and the sounds and smells of the museum room were not nearly so distracting as with the Rembrandt, to some extent being absorbed into the space between the Arp and me as if they belonged there.
The Rembrandt had a light of its own, generated within its frame, simultaneously illuminating and dissolving the man and the table within a rich engulfing darkness. a pedestal) , the Rembrandt dispossesses itself of its environment (with or without a frame). Consequently, the Rembrandt has a 'non-impacting between', for the space between the painting and myself has no significant perceptible forces; the Arp, conversely, has an 'impacting between', for the space between the material body of the sculpture and myself has significant perceptible forces [21] . Or, to put it another way, the space in front of the Rembrant seems inert; the space around the Arp seems enlivened.
III.
If these perceptions of mine are not idiosyncratic and my descriptions are accurate, then these descriptions are compelling primary evidence for clearly distinguishing the perception of sculpture from the perception of paintings. As with the perception of paintings, sight is also fundamental in the perception of sculptures. With sculpture, however, tactual and kinaesthetic sensations come into play in much more important ways than with painting. Even if a sculpture is not touched, it is a much more touch-determined art object than a painting. If painting is classified as a visual art, then sculpture is a visual-tactual art. If painting is classified as a 'static' art, then sculpture is a 'dynamic' art. Sculptures are not just art objects based on things but an entrance to and communion with things. Because sculpture influences how its surrounding space is perceived, sculpture possesses a charged, out-going quality: sculpture presences. Sculpture 'insists' on its own presence and acknowledgement as a thing in the space all things occupy. Representational paintings arrest the spectacle of the world, for they are primarily about the patina of things, the surfaces of shapes that have already emerged. Painting reflects the real world from outside, not from within that world. Sculpture, on the other hand, is the artistic presentation of existents within the world, for it is more about things as they emerge. Understanding these differences between painting and sculpture should help to clarify and enrich one's perceptions of them, for conceptual confusion leads to perceptual obscurity and poverty.
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